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Peter M. Lukevich (WSBA No. 18979, admitted 1989), of Seattle, received a censure on March 28, 2002, following a hearing. This discipline is based upon his failure to explain a matter to his client to the extent necessary for the client to make informed decisions, and failure to act with diligence and promptness from 1996 to 1999.
On May 31, 1996, Ms. P retained Mr. Lukevich to represent her in an employment claim against the Municipal Court of Seattle. Ms. P and Mr. Lukevich entered a contingency-fee agreement with a $5,000 nonrefundable retainer.
Prior to hiring Mr. Lukevich, another lawyer represented Ms. P and filed a lawsuit on her behalf, alleging wages owed and gender discrimination. The case proceeded to a bench trial in 1995, but was declared a mistrial when a witness was found to be a close acquaintance. The trial was rescheduled for June 1997. Ms. P informed Mr. Lukevich that she wanted a jury trial, and Mr. Lukevich agreed to file a jury demand, but did not do so.
In March and April 1997, Ms. P left messages for Mr. Lukevich inquiring about her case status, but he did not respond in a timely manner. Shortly before June 1997, one of Ms. P’s experts suffered a stroke, and Mr. Lukevich asked for a continuance, which the court denied. With Ms. P, Mr. Lukevich discussed going to trial without the expert, or dismissing and refiling the lawsuit. Mr. Lukevich advised Ms. P she had additional time under the statute of limitations to refile, though the three-year statute of limitations had expired. Ms. P agreed to dismiss and refile.
On June 5, 1997, Mr. Lukevich filed a motion and stipulation of the parties for voluntary nonsuit, and the suit was dismissed. On August 13, 1997, Mr. Lukevich refiled the lawsuit and trial was set for January 1999. Ms. P asked Mr. Lukevich to file an amended complaint to include incidents of retaliation after the initial lawsuit, to file a jury demand, and to depose witnesses regarding her retaliation claims. Mr. Lukevich agreed to do all three, but did not do so. Ms. P specifically asked Mr. Lukevich to depose Court Administrator K because he was very ill and was unlikely to survive until the time of trial. Mr. Lukevich agreed, but he did not depose Mr. K before his death in December 1998.
Ms. P wrote to Mr. Lukevich at least six times between February and November 1998, and repeatedly made calls expressing her concerns regarding his representation and requesting information. Mr. Lukevich did not respond in a timely manner and did not provide complete responses. In response to one message on October 19, 1998, Mr. Lukevich assured Ms. P everything was under control.
On October 22, 1998, the city filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that Ms. P’s claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. On October 26, Mr. Lukevich left a message for Ms. P assuring her he would work on the motion. Concerned that Mr. Lukevich was not attending to her case, Ms. P hired attorney Ms. R. Ms. P asked Mr. Lukevich to work with Ms. R, but he did not respond.
On November 9, 1998, Mr. Lukevich and Ms. R filed separate responses to the motion for summary judgment. Ms. R’s response included a request for continuance based on Mr. Lukevich’s alleged inadequate representation. On November 16, the court granted the continuance. On November 22, Mr. Lukevich wrote to Ms. R, stating he intended to withdraw from representation. On November 23, Ms. P wrote to Mr. Lukevich requesting a refund of $5,000 in attorney’s fees; however, Mr. Lukevich did not refund her fees. On November 30, Mr. Lukevich filed a notice of withdrawal and substitution of counsel. On May 24, 1999, the court issued an order partially granting the motion for summary judgment, and dismissed with prejudice all of Ms. P’s claims based on acts prior to August 13, 1994. The lawsuit was settled in June 1999.
Mr. Lukevich’s conduct violated RPCs 1.3 and 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to act with diligence and explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit clients to make informed decisions; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 1.2, 1.3 and 3.2, requiring lawyers to abide by clients’ decisions regarding the objectives of representation, act with diligence, and expedite litigation.
Marsha Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Lukevich represented himself. The hearing officer was Lawrence Mills.
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