DEC 19 2012

DISCHENNIE DE ARE

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

In re

STEPHEN L. CONROY

Lawyer (Bar No. 5074).

Proceeding No. 11#00063

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION

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Pursuant to Rule 10.13 of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct ("ELC"), a hearing was held before the undersigned Hearing Officer on September 27, 2012. Disciplinary counsel Debra Slater appeared for the Association and Respondent appeared *pro se*.

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I. FORMAL COMPLAINT

The Respondent was charged by formal complaint dated August 16, 2011, as amended on December 21, 2011, with 15 counts of violation of the following rules of professional conduct:

COUNT 1

By taking the \$3,324.70 that was PEMCO's contribution to grievant Carole Christie's attorney fees, and converting them to his own use, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c).

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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION - 1

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COUNT 2

By taking the \$2,466.49 that was Calypso's contribution to Christie's attorney fees, and converting them to his own use, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c).

COUNT 3

By taking the \$3,324.70 belonging to Christie, without her knowledge and/or consent, in violation of RCW 9A.56.030, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b).

COUNT 4

By taking the \$2,466.49 belonging to Christie, without her knowledge and/or consent, in violation of RCW 9A.56.030, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b).

COUNT 5

By failing to provide a written accounting to Christie, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(e).

COUNT 6

By misrepresenting to Christie the amount of the settlement that remained after payment of PEMCO and Calypso's subrogated claims, the amount that was available for distribution to Christie, and the total amount of money he received in fees, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c).

COUNT 7

By affixing a signature that was not Christie's genuine signature to the fee agreement and/or by offering and/or putting off the fee agreement as a true written instrument, which he knew to be forged, in violation of RCW 9A.60.020 (forgery), Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(d) and/or RPC 8.4(i).

COUNT 8

By affixing a signature to the "Memo to Carole Christie," that was not Christie's genuine signature, and/or by offering and/or putting off the "Memo to Carole Christie" as a

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION - 2

1	true written instrument, which he knew to be forged, in violation of RCW 9A.60.020 (forgery)
2	Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(d) and/or RPC 8.4(i).
3	COUNT 9
4	By submitting to the Association as part of its investigation of Christie's grievance, the
5	contingency fee agreement which he purported to be signed by Christie but was not,
6	Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a) and/or RPC 8.4(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(d)
7	and/or RPC 8.4(1) by violating ELC 5.3(e).
8	COUNT 10
9	By submitting to the Association as part of its investigation of Christie's grievance, the
10	"Memo to Carole Christie," which he purported to be signed by Christie but was not,
11	Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a) and/or RPC 8.4(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c).
12	<u>COUNT 11</u>
13	By submitting the contingent fee agreement to PEMCO, which he purported to be signed
14	by Christie but was not, in violation of RCW 48.30.230, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b) and/or
15	RPC 8.4(c) and/or RPC 8.4(d) and/or RPC 8.4(d).
16	COUNT 12
17	By failing to pay Christie the \$250 she had paid to him for filing fees and service of
18	process costs, and which he had received from PEMCO and Calypso, Respondent violated
19	RPC 1.15A(f) and/or RPC 1.15A(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c).
20	COUNT 13
21	By failing to communicate to Christie the rate of his fee for which she would be
22	responsible within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, Respondent violated
23	RPC 1.5(b).
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COUNT 14

By failing to enter into a written fee agreement signed by Christie for a contingent fee, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(c)(1).

COUNT 15

By failing to provide Christie with a written statement showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(c)(3).

II. HEARING

At the hearing on Thursday, September 27, 2012, five witnesses were sworn and presented testimony, and various exhibits were admitted into evidence. The transcript in this matter was received in mid-October and post-hearing briefs and proposed finding of fact and conclusions of law were received on November 13, 2012.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

After having considered the testimony of the witnesses and other exhibits, and having reviewed the post hearing written arguments of counsel and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer finds the following facts were established by a clear preponderance of the evidence. ELC 10.14(b). The following findings regarding Counts 1 through 15 are based on the evidence presented at the hearing and specific exhibits or testimony indicated.

A. <u>Jurisdictional Facts</u>.

- 1. Respondent was admitted to practice law in Washington on October 18, 1973.
- A grievance was filed against Respondent on May 31, 2010.
- 3. Respondent has no prior disciplinary actions against him.

¹ Respondent also sent a "Supplemental Argument" on November 21, 2012, 12 days after the extended deadline for filing post-hearing arguments and draft findings and conclusions, which was late and, accordingly, this submission was not considered by the undersigned.

B. Findings of Fact Regarding Counts 1-6 of the Bar Complaint.

- 1. On or about November 17, 2008, Respondent Conroy received an offer of judgment in proposed settlement from the PEMCO Insurance Company in the *Christie v. Brendemuhl* accident matter on which he had been retained to represent Ms. Christie, the grievant therein, and which underlying accident occurred on May 2, 2005 (Tr. 24, Ex. 200).
- 2. Within approximately four days, Respondent negotiated an increase in the initial settlement matter to \$25,000 to settle the accident claim. (Tr. 199, Ex. 133).
- 3. On or about November 20, 2008, Respondent and Ms. Christie met in his office and went over an offer of judgment in the amount of \$20,000 that had been served and filed by the defendants in the litigation (Tr. 47, Ex. 200).
- 4. Prior to the offer of judgment, Respondent had not communicated with Ms. Christie as to the basis or alternative formula for computation of his fees in the matter, nor the basis of any charges of cost advances on her behalf, nor had the Respondent entered into any written fee agreement with Ms. Christie. Tr. 48.
- 5. Up to that point, Ms. Christie had no concept of what the Respondent's fees would be or what she might be entitled to in a settlement of the matter. Tr. 48.
- 6. At the November 20, 2008 meeting Mr. Conroy also did not discuss the fact that the current subrogation lien of PEMCO and that of Premera Blue Cross/Calypso could be mitigated under the decision in the *Mahler v. Szucs*, 135 Wn.2d 398 (1998) case, which has revised the law and treatment of subrogation claims in personal injury settlements in this state. Tr. 108, 110-111.
- 7. On or about November 25, 2008, Ms. Christie agreed to the \$25,000 settlement in a telephone call with Mr. Conroy. Tr. 50. (Ms. Christie's qualified date of November 21, 2008 is incorrect).
- 8. On November 25, 2008, Respondent wrote Calypso as the adjuster/third-party claims administrator for Premera and inquired as to the total amount of the medical liens subrogated on the Christie matter. (Ex. 106).
- 9. On November 28, 2008, Ms. Christie wrote the Respondent expressing confusion about how medical bills would be resolved and frustration over the apparent outcome of the case and asking for additional guidance on possible remaining outcomes and strategies while noting her marginal financial circumstances which she attributed to the accident and its outcome. (Ex. 107).

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION - 5

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- 10. On December 3, 2008, PEMCO sent Respondent a letter indicating its \$10,000 subrogation lien for personal injury protection was to be protected in the settlement per an attached worksheet of wage loss reimbursements and indicating that their amount of contribution towards their insured's legal expenses would need to be supported by the amount of the settlement, a copy of the fee agreement and an itemized bill for costs. (Ex. 118).
- 11. Respondent sent a fax that same day to Mr. Edwards at PEMCO Insurance responding to its December 3, 2008 letter by providing the \$25,000 settlement amount, a list of itemized costs, a handwritten note indicating that the filing fee of \$250 was an additional extra and attaching a purported fee agreement dated February 26, 2008 pursuant to their request. (Ex. 118).
- 12. On December 8, 2008, Calypso responded to the Respondent's November 28 letter by offering to reduce its subrogated lien amount by one-third, to \$4,932.87, and disallowing any costs in pursuing the claim by Ms. Christie. Calypso included in its letter a spreadsheet totaling the cumulative costs of the original lien. (Ex. 109).
- 13. On January 6, 2009, Carole Christie endorsed a settlement check of \$25,000 dated December 31, 2008 and accompanied the Respondent to his bank to cash the check and deposit it into his IOLTA account (Ex. 129).
- On January 6, 2009, Mr. Conroy did not tell Ms. Christie that either PEMCO or Calypso had agreed to contribute to her legal fees. (Tr. 55, 56).
- 15. Mr. Conroy's contravening testimony that he had in fact repeatedly told Ms. Christie verbally of those contributions at an unspecified date is not credible. (Tr. 179, 180, 191).
- 16. On January 7, 2009, Mr. Conroy wrote Ms. Christie a letter regarding disbursement of the settlement funds in which he describes, after consultation with "the other members of the law office" [he is a sole practitioner renting space from another law firm], that he must pay PEMCO \$10,000 "as required by law" that he is getting \$5,000 for legal services in the case and "of course nothing is left for you. We have simply paid the bills." (Ex. 110).
- 17. By checks dated January 13, 2009, Respondent wrote a series of disbursements from his IOLTA account relating to the settlement including \$6,375.30 for PEMCO, \$4,932.87 for Calypso, and some other miscellaneous medical checks and \$11,091.09 to himself with no proceeds going to Ms. Christie. (Tr. 190-192, Ex. 128, 134).

- 18. The moneys provided by PEMCO and Calypso in reduction of their subrogation liens were the amounts contributed by them to Ms. Christie for her legal expenses which belonged to her.
- 19. Mr. Conroy's fees should have been limited to \$5,000 but instead he paid himself over twice that amount out of trust without any contemporaneous provision of a disbursement record to Ms. Christie and without telling her anything about the *Mahler* decision's impact in reducing the original amount of the subrogation liens in contribution to her legal fees.

C. Findings of Fact Regarding Counts 7-11 of the Bar Complaint.

- 20. There are two focal documents in the proceeding which bear on the most significant counts of the Complaint brought by the Bar Association against the Respondent. The first is an "Agreement for Legal Services" that the grievant was alleged to have signed setting forth the terms and conditions of her retention by the Respondent. (Ex. 101).
- 21. Exhibit 101 is a two-page agreement which reflects, *inter alia*, retention of Mr. Conroy as counsel to represent the grievant involving an automobile accident of 5/2/2002 and purports to pay counsel 33-1/3% of any sums received by settlement or at trial. The document also reflects a date of 2/26/08 and appears to be signed by both the Respondent and the grievant as counsel.
- 22. Carole Christie testified repeatedly that she never understood the terms of Respondent's representation and that she did not sign a "contract" with Mr. Conroy. (Tr. 35).
- 23. Ms. Christie also testified that while the signature on page 2 of Exhibit 101 appeared to be her signature, she did not sign the document and she also had no copy of the document in her records. (Tr. 35).
- 24. The Respondent testified he had presented the fee agreement to the grievant for her signature, but that Exhibit 101 was not the agreement he had her sign and the signature on Exhibit 101 was not in fact his. (Tr. 159, 160).
- 25. Additionally, the Respondent testified that Exhibit 101 was a "fabricated document." (Tr. 160).
- Mr. Conroy further testified that he did not believe he and Ms. Christie signed a fee agreement on February 26, 2008, but that she did sign a fee agreement at some point but does not remember when and never produced another copy or version of the agreement despite being subpoenaed or otherwise asked for it by the Bar Association. (Ex. 126, Tr. 161).

(Ex. 121, Tr. 215).

- 36. Exhibit 131, prepared by Mr. Nishimura, establishes by a clear preponderance of the evidence how the signature of Ms. Christie was transposed on to the "Memo to Carole Christie." (Ex. 105).
- 37. Respondent's testimony regarding the alterations and source of Ms. Christie's signature on Exhibit 105 correspondingly are not credible. (Tr. 145, 146).
- 38. Respondent knowingly provided both Exhibit 101 and Exhibit 105 to the Bar Association in the course of its investigation of this grievance.

D. Findings of Fact Regarding Counts 12-15 of the Bar Complaint.

- 39. Carole Christie advanced a filing fee of \$250 for the litigation which Respondent acknowledged in a receipt dated April 7, 2008. (Tr. 37 and Ex. 103).
- 40. PEMCO paid at least a portion of these costs in settling its subrogation claim and Respondent noted the filing fee of \$250 in a handwritten addendum to his letter from Kent Edwards of December 3, 2008 which he had included in that letter as an attachment in calculating Plaintiff's costs at \$811.76. (Ex. 118).
- 41. By providing Ms. Christie nothing from the settlement, Respondent failed to reimburse her at least the 33-1/3% of the proportionate share of the filing fee which the client, not Respondent, had advanced.
- 42. As found previously, Respondent also failed to communicate the basis of his fees or how they would be calculated within a reasonable time after commencing the representation on or about February 28, 2008.
- 43. Even up until the actual negotiation of the settlement check by Ms. Christie on January 6, 2009 at Respondent's bank, there is evidence of record that Ms. Christie was unaware of what she would be receiving from the settlement which was only conclusively established as zero by the Respondent by letter dated January 7, 2009. (Tr. 54, 55; Ex. 110).
- 44. Respondent never provided Carole Christie with any written statement showing the breakdown of the settlement fees such as that depicted in the Association's Exhibit 132, nor was there any written explanation to the client of how his fees were calculated, the amount of the subrogation lien payments actually remitted or any reconciliation of any moneys remaining in his IOLTA account after disbursements. (Tr. 192 and Tr. 232).

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RPC 1.15A(b), and RPC 8.4(c).

COUNT 2: Similarly, by paying himself the \$2,466.49 sum that was Calypso's contribution to Christie's attorney's fees, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b), and RPC 8.4(c).

IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON COUNTS OF THE COMPLAINT

preponderance of the evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Conclusions of Law:

client's attorney's fees under the Mahler Washington Supreme Court decision and which

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact again found to have been established by a clear

COUNT 1: By paying himself the \$3,324.70 that was PEMCO's contribution to his

COUNT 3: Because he took the \$3,324.70 amount of the PEMCO lien contributed to Ms. Christie's attorney's fees without her knowledge and/or consent, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b) and RCW 9A.56.030.

COUNT 4: Similarly, because the Respondent took the \$2,466.49 belonging to Ms. Christie as Calypso's contribution to her attorney's fees without her knowledge and consent, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b) and RCW 9A.56.030.

COUNT 5: In not providing a written accounting to Carole Christie detailing the amount of fees he was taking, the actual amount of the subrogation liens compromised and the amount of any funds remaining in his IOLTA account, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A (c).

COUNT 6: By intentionally misrepresenting the amount of the settlement that remained after payment of the subrogated claims and by not confiding either the amount available for distribution to Ms. Christie or the actual total amount he was receiving in fees, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(c).

COUNT 7: By superimposing a signature of Carole Christie onto the Legal Services

Agreement and by proffering the fee agreement as a fully integrated document (Ex. 101) which

he knew was falsified, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), RPC 8.4(i) and RCW 9.A.60.020.

COUNT 8: Similarly, by affixing/super-imposing a signature onto the "Memo to Carole Christie" that was not in fact her genuine signature and/or by proffering/putting off the document (Ex. 105) as a true written instrument which he knew to be falsified/altered, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), RPC 8.4(i) and RCW 9A.60.020.

COUNT 9: In submitting to the Bar Association as part of its investigation the contingency fee agreement which he represented as signed by Ms. Christie but which he knew was not, Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a), RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and RPC 8.4(i) in violation of ELC 5.3(e).

COUNT 10: In submitting to the Association the "Memo to Carole Christie" which he passed off as signed by Ms. Christie but was not in the course of the Bar Association's investigation, Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a), RPC 8.4(b) and 8.4(c).

COUNT 11: Similarly, in submitting the contingent fee agreement to PEMCO on December 3, 2008 which he proffered as signed by Ms. Christie but which he knew was not, Respondent violated RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and RCW 48.30.230 by making/presenting a false claim for the payment of an insurance contract under the cited latter statutory provision.

COUNT 12: In failing to reimburse Carole Christie cost advances on her behalf which she had paid to him for filing fees and service costs from which he had received reimbursement from PEMCO, Respondent violated RPC 1.15A(b), RPC 1.15A(f), and RPC 8.4(c).

COUNT 13: By failing to communicate the basis or rate of his fee for which Ms. Christie would be responsible within a reasonable amount of time after commencing her representation, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(b).

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COUNT 14: By failing to enter into a written fee agreement actually signed by Ms. Christie contingent upon the outcome of a matter, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(c)(1).

COUNT 15: Finally, by failing to provide Carole Christie with a written statement reflecting the outcome of the matter, and upon recovery, failing to reflect the remittance to the client and the method of its determination, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(c)(3).

V. PRESUMPTIVE FINDINGS

Applying the Presumptive Sanctions sections as the Hearing Officer is required to do under Washington law set forth in the American Bar Association ("ABA") Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions first by analyzing the ethical duty violated and considering the lawyer's mental state and the potential injury caused by the misconduct and finally, (to be addressed below), the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, the following presumptive sanctions are found applicable to Respondent's conduct in this proceeding which will subsequently be summarized by individual count below.

ABA Standard 4.0 Violations of Duties Owed to Clients

ABA Standard 4.1 Failure to Preserve the Client's Property.

ABA Standard 4.11 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

ABA Standard 4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

ABA Standard 4.6 Lack of Candor.

ABA Standard 4.61 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential injury to a client.

ABA Standard 4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a layer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION - 12

ABA Standard 5.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Public

ABA Standard 5.1 Failure to maintain personal integrity.

ABA Standard 5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

- a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriate or theft...or;
- b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

ABA Standard 6.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Legal System

ABA Standard 6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false statement, or improperly holds material information and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

ABA Standard 7.0 Violations of Duties Owed As a Professional

ABA Standard 7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public or the legal system.

ABA Standard 7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system;

Having carefully weighed applicable presumptive sanctions and having considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Section 9.22, the Hearing Officer finds the following aggravating factors present: b) a dishonest or selfish motive; c) a pattern of misconduct; d) multiple offenses; e) submission of false evidence; f) false statements or other

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deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; h) vulnerability of victim; i) substantial experience in the practice of law; j) indifference to making restitution; and k) illegal conduct. In reviewing the mitigating factors herein, the Hearing Officer finds the following sections in Section 9.32 here pertinent: a) the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

Based on this review of aggravating and mitigating factors the Hearing Officer specifically finds, pursuant to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the following conclusions under the Presumptive Section Standards, which are again set out by individual count.

COUNT 1: After finding the Respondent acted intentionally in converting the PEMCO contribution to his own use in violation of RPC 1.15A(b), and RPC 8.4(c), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer finds the presumptive ABA Standards of 4.11 and 5.11 apply, and in applying the mitigating and aggravating factors, also finds there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of disbarment.

COUNT 2: In similarly finding that the payment of the \$2,466.49 amount that was Calypso's contribution to Ms. Christie's attorney's fees constituted violations of RPC 1.5A(b), RPC 1.5A(e), RPC 1.5A(f), RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c) and 8.4(i), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the hearing officer finds the presumptive ABA Standards of 4.11 and 5.11 apply to these violations as well which establishes a presumptive standard of disbarment.

COUNT 3: After finding that in taking the PEMCO contribution to attorney's fees which belonged to Ms. Christie without her knowledge and consent to be a violation of RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), and RPC 8.4(i), and in applying the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors here, the Hearing Officer finds that there is no basis to depart from a presumptive ABA Standard of 5.11 as of disbarment applying here.

COUNT 4: After finding that the Respondent's remission of the \$2,466.49 belonging to Ms. Christie which was Calypso's contribution to her attorney's fees without her knowledge and/or consent to be a violation of RCW 9.56.030 and RPC 8.4(b), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer finds the presumptive ABA Standard 5.1 applies thereto and that there is no basis to depart from the presumptive standard of disbarment.

COUNT 5: In finding that Respondent's failure to provide a written accounting to Ms. Christie violated RPC 1.15A(e), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer finds the presumptive ABA Standard of 4.11 applies and that there is no reason to depart from that standard of disbarment.

COUNT 6: After finding that Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Christie the amount of the settlement proceeds remaining after PEMCO and Calypso's subrogated lien claims less the contribution to attorney's fees, the amount she was to receive and the amount Respondent ultimately received to be a violation of RPC 8.4(c), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer finds the presumptive ABA Standards of 4.11 and 5.11 of disbarment apply.

COUNT 7: After finding that affixing/super-imposing Ms. Christie's signature on the Agreement for Legal Services which was not her genuine signature by proffering/putting off the fee agreement as a true written instrument which he knew was not true and was falsified/altered in violation of RCW 9A.60.020 and RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC(d), and RPC 8.4(i), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer now concludes the appropriate presumptive sanction 4.11 and sanction 6.11 apply for these violations is disbarment.

COUNT 8: Similarly, after finding that affixing/super-imposing Ms. Christie's signature on the Memo to Carole Christie that was not her genuine signature and by

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proffering/putting off the document as a true written instrument which he knew was not true and/or was falsified in violation of RCW 9A.60.020 and RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and RPC 8.4(i), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer now concludes the appropriate ABA Standards 4.11 and Standard 6.11 apply, which for these violations, is disbarment.

COUNT 9: In finding the submission to the Bar Association as part of its investigation of this matter of a falsified/altered fee agreement which purported to contain a genuine signature of Carole Christie but which he knew to be a forgery, Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a), RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), RPC 8.4(d), and RPC 8.4(i), and after weighing the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes that presumptive ABA Standards 5.11, 6.11 and 7.1 are applicable here which provide for disbarment as the appropriate sanction.

COUNT 10: In finding the submission to the Bar Association by Respondent as part of its investigation in this matter of a falsified/altered "Memo to Carole Christie" which purported to contain a genuine signature of the client in which among other things she purportedly agreed to receive nothing from the settlement, Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a), RPC 8.4(b), and RPC 8.4(c), and after weighing the appropriate aggravation and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes there is no reason to depart from the application of the presumptive standards of disbarment as set forth in ABA standards 5.11 and 7.1.

COUNT 11: In finding that the submission of a contingent fee agreement, with a signature of Carole Christie which Respondent knew to be falsified/super-imposed and not her true signature a violation of RCW 48.30.230 and RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), and RPC 8.4(d), and after weighing the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes as well that there is no reason to depart from the presumptive standards of

disbarment set forth in applicable ABA Standards of 5.11, 6.11 and 7.1, prescribing disbarment.

COUNT 12: In finding that Respondent failed to ever repay the \$250 filing fee and service of process costs which he had received from PEMCO which violated RPC 1.15A(b), RPC 1.15A(f), and RPC 8.4(c), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes that the presumptive ABA Standards 4.12 and 5.12 should apply for which the sanction is suspension.

COUNT 13: In finding that Respondent failed to communicate to Carole Christie the basis or rate of his fee for which she would be responsible within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, Respondent violated RPC 1.5(b), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes the presumptive ABA Standard 4.62 is applicable for this violation which prescribes suspension.

COUNT 14: In finding that Respondent failed to enter into a written fee agreement actually signed by his client in aid of his attempt to obfuscate what he was to be paid and thereby violated RPC 1.5(c)(3), and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes that ABA Standard 4.62 prescribing suspension is applicable for this violation.

COUNT 15: In finding that Respondent's failure to provide Carole Christie with a written statement showing the remittance to the client, the disbursements provided to all parties and the method of its determination, Respondent again violated RPC 1.5(c)(3), and that Respondent acted deliberately in so doing to conceal how much money he was actually paying himself and thereby seriously injuring his client, and after weighing appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer concludes that ABA Standard 4.61 is applicable here for which the appropriate standard is disbarment.

VI. <u>CONCLUSION/ULTIMATE PRESUMPTIVE SANCTION</u>

In weighing the evidence with regard to all of the above counts and subsequently analyzing by individual count the presumptive sanctions therefore and specifically with regard to Counts 7 through 10 of the Complaint the Hearing Officer identifies some recent case law pertinent to the circumstances. *In re the Disciplinary Proceeding of Jeffery G. Poole*, 156 Wn.2d 196 (2006), a hearing officer must appropriately weigh various aggravating and mitigating factors.

As in *Poole* the undersigned hearing officer here finds the creation of the fee agreement document (Exhibit 101) and the "Memo to Carole Christie" (Exhibit 105) with super imposed "cut and pasted" signatures were created with an intent to deceive the Bar both through the facilitation of the settlement Exhibit 101 and to otherwise thwart the Bar's investigation. Exhibit 105. The original fee agreement was submitted both to PEMCO and subsequently to the Bar Association to attempt to resolve both the settlement and the Complaint investigation favorably from the Respondent's standpoint and was initiated with the conscious awareness by the Respondent that he was providing fabricated evidence and which ultimately was done to better his position in the disciplinary process for his benefit.

The Respondent has not admitted nor acknowledged the wrongful nature of this conduct but in post hearing filings appears to now blame the client/victim for this fabrication. While, In re the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Linda J. Whitt, 149 Wn.2d 707 (2003), notes, as here, the Respondent has no prior disciplinary violations, a lack of prior discipline "does not necessarily reduce sanction" rather, the weight given to it is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Whitt at 721. The Whitt Court found the attorney's false representations during the disciplinary process "caused serious or potential serious injury to her client, the public and the legal system as a whole." Whitt at 719.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION - 18

Here, the undersigned finds the seriousness of the violations committed by Respondent regarding: 1) the creation of the fee agreement and the memo to the client allegedly reflecting her agreement to the settlement terms; 2) the fact that she would get absolutely nothing from the settlement; 3) the fee agreement and client memo use in the Bar investigation process; and 4) the Respondent's denial and lack of rationale for the discrepancy regarding the fabricated signature documents all appear to be sufficiently eggregious not to be susceptible to mitigation by his lack of prior disciplinary actions.

In short, in the Hearing Officer's considered view the aggravating factors found here applicable under ABA Standard 9.22(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) and (k) outweigh the proposed disciplinary sanctions found in the Conclusions of Law relative to Counts 12 through 14 above which do not warrant disbarment. Under *In re the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Richard A. Peterson*, 120 Wn.2d 833 (1993), they are thus merged into the more serious recommended sanction of disbarment.

VII. RECOMMENDATION SANCTION AND CONCLUSION, AND RESTITUTION

When multiple ethical violations are found, the ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct. *Peterson* at 854. Based on the aggravating and mitigating factors evaluated at length above, the Hearing Officer recommends that Respondent Steven L. Conroy be disbarred from the practice of law. Finally, I recommend that restitution to grievant Carole Christie be ordered in the amount of \$6,091.09 reflecting the total corrected disbursement amount set forth in Exhibit 132 and that future reinstatement of Respondent be conditioned on payment of restitution noted here.

DATED this _____ day of December, 2012.

David W. Wiley,

Hearing Officer

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION - 19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I caused a copy of the FOF, LOL & HO'S PELD MENDET ON
to be delivered to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and to be mailed to SCONA (MIN) Respondent Respondent's Counsel
postage prepaid on the day of Dull Will , 1072
Clerk/Counsel to the Disciplinary Board
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